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Abstract
This study uses optimal control theory to examine the dynamic features of agricultural landscapes
characterized by spatial externalites.  A stylized system of agricultural production and groundwater flow
is used to illustrate how spatial externalities affect land use decisions over time.  Policy alternatives are
also considered.3
Using Optimal Control to Characterize the Economic and 
Ecological Implications of Spatial Externalities
1. INTRODUCTION
For decades, environmental economists have discussed the implications of externalities as a
cause of market failure.  According to Baumol and Oates (1988,[1]) an externality exists “whenever
some individual’s (say A’s) utility or production relationships include real (that is, nonmonetary
variables) whose values are chosen by others (persons, corporations, governments) without particular
attention to the effects on A’s welfare.”  Many issues of concern with regard to natural resources, such
as the contamination of air or water, fall under the category of negative environmental externalities; the
contamination is produced as a side effect of some production process, and it then affects the utility (or
production value) of individuals who are not involved in those production decisions.  Environmental
economists have illustrated that if the disutility to the affected individuals is not taken into account in the
original production decision, then an excessive level of production will be engaged in, and a socially
excessive amount of contamination will be produced.
Economists have also explored a range of possible solutions to externality problems.  These
solutions range from command and control approaches that specify maximum production or
contaminant levels to incentive- (or market-) based approaches that induce the original producer to
take into account the cost that their production externalities are imposing on others when they are
making their production decisions.  This accountability may be enforced through taxes on production or
contaminated emissions, for instance, or through the implementation of marketable permits schemes that4
force to producers to pay for their contamination through the purchase of permits.  These approaches,
and the concepts of externalities in general, have been described in detail throughout the literature. 
The proliferation of techniques enabling dynamic social optimization, with its emphasis on the
future impacts of current production decisions, brought a new dimension to the analysis of
environmental externalities.  Some environmental externalities form stock pollutants, for instance, whose
production and utility effects are not limited to the time period in which they are produced.  Designing a
policy to compel polluters to take into account the costs of emitting a ton of carbon dioxide must take
into account not only the current costs of that emission but also the future stream of costs that arises
from having that extra ton is the atmosphere (Falk and Mendelsohn, 1993[3]).
There is a final dimension to the analysis of environmental externalities that has received less
attention in the literature, but that is equally relevant in the analysis and design of policy solutions.  Just
as the effects of externalities extend, and vary, temporally, they also vary spatially.  In their discussion of
policies to deal with externalities, Baumol and Oates acknowledge the complexity introduced when
geographical distinctions among polluters must be taken into account; permit and tax systems that might
otherwise appear, at least theoretically, quite simple to implement become cumbersome to administer
when spatial distinctions are involved (see Braden et al. 1989[2], Henderson, 1977[5], Morgan,
1999[6]).
Unfortunately for the simplicity of environmental policies, spatial distinctions with respect to
external environmental effects probably represent the rule rather than the exception.  An examination of
the spatial aspect of environmental externalities suggests that the effects of externalities, and the extent
to which they enter into individuals’ production or utility functions, operate at a number of different5
levels.  Certain types of contamination, such as upper atmosphere ozone pollution, have global effects,
so that individuals located hundreds of miles away from the source of contamination are affected as
substantially as those immediately adjacent to the source of contamination.  At this global level, the
effects of ozone pollution can be considered nonspatial, for there is little geographical distinction in how
the externality enters distinct production and utility functions.  However, most types of contamination,
including ozone pollution, have local effects as well; the magnitude of the effects at the local level may
far exceed the magnitude of the global effects, and these effects are often spatially differentiated.  This
spatial differentiation can either arise from distance effects, in which individuals farther from the source
of the externality are less strongly affected by it, or from directional effects, where the effects of an
externality are not felt uniformly at a given distance from the source point.  Directional differentiation
arises from a combination of natural processes and channels of dispersion, such as wind patterns or
ground- or surface- water flow patterns, and institutional factors such as the positioning of wells or
monitoring stations.  Although a watershed’s groundwater flow is physically fixed, for instance, the
effects of each individual producers’ contribution to groundwater contamination, and the producers’
“responsibility” for those effects in the design of policy, will depend on both the producer’s location
within the watershed and where within the watershed a drinking water well is placed. 
The presence of such geographical distinctions considerably complicates the implementation of
policies designed to force the internalization of external costs in producer’s production decisions (see,
e.g., Goetz and Zilberman, 2000[4] and Morgan, 1999[6]).  Recent studies have examined, for
instance, the design of permit schemes in watersheds where contamination is measured at a single well.
Such schemes require the use of large integrated models to calculate a transfer coefficient that describes6
how production activity at the source translates into contamination at the measurement point; this
calculation must be made separately for each individual producer in order to design an efficient structure
of permit trading ratios.  An individual distant from a measurement well, for instance, may require fewer
emissions permits for the same amount of production activity as an individual immediately adjacent to
the well; the ratio of permits required for activity arises from a comparison of the producers’ transfer
coefficients.
While acknowledging the presence and importance of institutionally imposed complications
such as those mentioned in the case of placement decisions for drinking water wells, this study focuses
on the complications introduced into policy design by purely physical processes in the creation of
directional externalities.  A highly stylized system of agricultural production and groundwater flow is
used to illustrate how directional externalities can appear in an optimal control analysis of land use
decisions, what their environmental and ecological effects would be on a steady state solution, and what
implications they have for possible policy alternatives.
2. METHODOLOGY: OPTIMAL CONTROL
Dynamic optimization problems seek a solution to the question of what is the optimal path of
resource use over time for the management interval of interest.  A solution to a dynamic optimization
problem therefore provides an optimal magnitude for every choice variable at any given point in the
management interval.  Optimal control is a solution method for dynamic optimization problems that
establishes and then solves necessary conditions for optimal resource use over time.  Optimal control
divides a system’s endogenous variables into control variables, which are the decision variables
available to the system’s manager, and state variables, which describe the state of the system’s7
components.  The state variables evolve within the system according to a series of first order differential
equations called the equations of motion.
One set of necessary conditions for an optimal control solution applies to a solution for a steady
state, which is an equilibrium solution in which the magnitude of the state and choice variables remains
constant over time, with an infinite time horizon.  Steady state solutions conform to the popular notion of
sustainability in that they describe a decision solution that maximizes a given objective function subject
to the condition that the state of the system is unchanging in perpetuity.  Such an analysis permits a type
of comparative statics that is analogous to that traditionally applied in static analyses; this approach
might explore, for instance, how sensitive the steady-state, or sustainable, levels of choice and control
variables are to changes in exogenous variables.  This research will use a steady-state analysis to
explore how the sustainability of a highly stylized production system is affected by the exogenous
variables that form that system’s physical framework.
3. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Consider the case of multiple agricultural producers, each of whom produce using the same
production function.  Production on each parcel is a function of effort applied (xi), generic hydrological
contamination (hi), and level of contaminant abatement selected (ai). 
Pi=f(xi, hi, ai)
where i indexes agricultural production units.  The control, or decision, variables in this scenario are xi
and ai.  The state variables are hi, and the level of contamination changes according to the equations of
motion, which describe what physical processes operate on the contamination level in each period and8
how it responds to changes in agricultural effort, abatement levels, or the hydrological contamination
present:
& h g (x ,x ,h ,h ,a ,a ) i i i i i i i i = ￿ ￿ ￿
Note that the state equation   is indexed by i; this allows for differences in how the level of g () i ￿
contamination changes in each production unit.  Also, the equation of motion for cell i can depend on
activity and decisions outside of cell i ( ).  In this framework, therefore, it is the state equation that ￿i
describes the structure of the externality, which in this case will be illustrated by the movement of
hydrological contamination among the cells.
In this model, the underlying physical process of contaminant flow creates an economic
externality because production is sensitive to level of contamination; the production decisions in the
contaminant source cell therefore impact the production function in the contaminant receptor cell.  A
social optimizer who optimizes aggregate production value of the landscape would take into account
this contaminant flow, and the effect that upstream production has on downstream production (both in
the current and future time periods), but an individual optimizer would not.  The two optimization
processes therefore produce different steady state solutions, with different levels of both the choice
variables (effort and abatement) and the state variable (contamination level in each cell).  Under the
individual optimization, with no policy intervention, the downstream producer making optimization
decisions must take the incoming contaminant flow (and its effect on current and future productivity) as
given and optimize accordingly.  The difference between the aggregate landscape value under the9
socially optimal solution and the individually optimal solution represents the cost of having no policy
intervention to correct for the externality.
The specific analytic form of the state equation can vary depending on how the physical
processes underlying the externality operate; the form of the state equation and the resulting steady state
solution will vary, for instance, depending on whether contaminant movement from one cell to the next
is a function of existing hydrological levels, differences in contaminant concentration, effort levels, etc.
The cost of a non-intervention policy will also vary, therefore, depending on the physical structure
underlying the externality and how it appears in the state equation.  It is important to emphasize, of
course, that a truly realistic representation of the underlying physical process would require more than a
single ordinary differential equation.  The simplification of the model, which allows for analytical
tractability, is useful as an illustration of the sensitivity of both costs and policy recommendations to the
underlying physical process.
To illustrate the effect of different forms of externality on the steady state solutions, the social
cost of non-intervention, and the structure of an appropriate policy, consider the following example.
Consider a landscape consisting of two cells, each of which produces according to the following
function:
f(x ,h ,a ) x b x h c a i i i i i
2
i
2
i
2 = - ￿ - - ￿
Suppose in addition that cell 1 is upstream of cell 2, and that hydrological contamination flows
downstream. This flow enters into the state equation for each cell as follows:
& h x a flow1 1 1 1 = - -10
& h x a flow1- flow2 2 2 2 = - +
Where flow1 represents the amount that flows from cell 1 to cell 2 in each time step, and flow2
represents the amount that flows out of cell 2, and from there out of the production system, in each time
step.  It is the specific form of flow1 and flow2 that captures the exact nature of the physical flow and
the spatial externality it generates.  This study will examine the case of three possible scenarios:
1.  flow1 and flow2 are both constants determined by some exogenous physical structure
flow1= f1
flow2= f2
2. flow is a simple percentage of existing hydrological contamination level:
flow1 f h1 = ￿
flow2 f h2 = ￿
3. flow is a simple percentage of current agricultural effort:
flow1 f x1 = ￿
flow2 f x2 = ￿
Each of these scenarios produces different socially and individually optimal solutions.  Section Four will
compare the equilibrium values of state and control variables under the three different externality types
to their respective socially optimal equilibrium values.  Section 5 will discuss policy solutions that can be
designed to correct spatially explicit externalities in a dynamic context.1The only aspect of the upstream production decision that affects the downstream cell is the
decision to produce at all; no wedge is driven as long as the socially optimal solution is not a corner
solution. If it were socially optimal for the upstream cell not to engage in agriculture at all, then the
social optimal could diverge from the private optimal as a result of the presence of a fixed contaminant
flow. That scenario is not addressed in this paper. 
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4. RESULTS
The first scenario, in which flow of pollutants is a constant value, is an interesting illustration of a
subtle distinction that exists within the definition of an externality.  Under this scenario, the socially and
privately optimal equilibrium values appear as shown in Table 1.  Clearly, there are no differences
between the socially and privately optimal production activities and stock contamination levels.  This is
because the economic externality arises not directly from the contaminant flow itself, but from the
impacts of upstream activities on the downstream activity decisions.  In this case, where flow is a
constant, the upstream production choices themselves do not impact in any way downstream
production choices, therefore no externality exists, no wedge is driven between the socially and
privately optimal decisions, and there is no difference between the solutions.1
This observation highlights the fact that there may not be social cost associated with the flow
itself; a cost only exists if this flow acts as a conduit through which upstream activity can impact
downstream productivity.  The purpose of intervening policy in the case of a downstream pollutant flow
is therefore not to correct for the presence of the flow; the presence of the flow is a natural physical
process that is taken into account in determining the socially optimal levels of the state and control
variables.  The fact that the downstream cell has to abate an additional amount to compensate for the f1
arriving from upstream is not inherently inefficient.  The inefficiency arises from the externality, or the12
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Table 1: Socially and privately optimal levels when flow is a constant
impact of upstream decisions on downstream productivity.  In this case, beyond the decision to
produce at a non-zero level, the upstream decisions do not directly affect the flow, and therefore do not
affect downstream choices.  There is therefore no economic inefficiency in this system that would
require policy intervention.
Consider in contrast the case where the magnitude of flow is a function of the accumulated
contamination level in a cell.  In this case, upstream production decisions, and the level of upstream
choice variables, will impact on downstream productivity through their effect on h1; differences in h1 are2For simplicity, the results presented in the following graph assume that r=0.
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transported to the downstream cell through the flow parameter.  The results under this scenario are
shown in Table 22.
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Table 2: Socially and privately optimal levels when flow is a function of the accumulated contamination
level in a cell3Assuming nonnegativity constraints on b, c, and f
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Under this scenario, an externality does exist. In the upstream cell, a private optimization produces a
higher equilibrium level of x1 and h1, and a lower equilibrium abatement level.3  The downstream cell,
whose private optimization process is sensitive to the upstream contaminant level, also carries a higher
contaminant level (h2), and in addition suffers from  higher abatement costs, and a lower optimal
agricultural effort level (x2).  Under a social optimum, the upstream decisions contributing to
contamination should take into account not only the discounted future costs that will accrue to the
upstream cell itself, but the discounted future costs that accrue to the downstream cell as well.  Under a
private optimum, the upstream cell only considers the discounted future costs to itself in the optimization
procedure, and therefore carries a higher contamination level.  The result of the externality is therefore
not only a loss in overall landscape productivity, but an increase in landscape contamination.  It is this
increase in landscape contamination that produces the decline in productivity; other possible impacts of
increased contaminant runoff from cell 2, unrelated to productivity, are not taken into consideration in
this approach.  Such impacts would create an even wider wedge between the social and privately
optimal steady states, for when taken into account in the social optimization they would result in a
decline of equilibrium contamination levels, though the private optimization results would remain
unchanged.
Different results are obtained under the third scenario, in which flow is a function of current
effort rather than current contamination levels.  The results are reported in Table 3.  Again, an xternality
exists that is driving the difference between socially and privately optimal equilibrium solutions. As in the15
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Table 3: Socially and privately optimal levels when flow is a function of current agricultural effort
scenario above, the private optimization produces a higher h1 and x1, and lower a1, and a higher h2 and
a2 and lower x2, than the social optimization.  There are a couple of interesting things to note about both
the social and private equilibria in this case.  Most noticeably, only the optimal state variable levels h1
*
and h2
* are sensitive to the discount rate. This is because when the externality arises from flow related
to the control variable rather than to the state variable, then its downstream effect can be compensated
for in a single time period.  The downstream cell prevents future repercussions of this period’s
increased upstream activity simply by abating more in the current time period.  Therefore optimal levels16
of the control variables do not depend on the discount rate, which would indicate how heavily future
costs should be taken into account now, because no future costs are generated. 
The levels of the state variables remain sensitive to the discount rate, however, because the
accumulating contamination levels always have future costs through the reduction of future productivity.
Note that if r=0, so that future impacts count as much as current impacts, then the optimal
contamination level at any point on the landscape is 0.  The optimum strategy is always to simply
maintain minimum contamination and maximum productivity. As r increases, all of the decision variables
remain the same, but the level of the state variable contamination increases.  Increasing r means that it
may be optimal to maintain a certain level of contamination if the costs of abating it in the present time
period are not justified by the discounted stream of future avoided costs.
This is not the case when flow is a function of the state variable (scenario 2).  In this case,
increased upstream production effort xt will continue to be felt downstream in periods t+1, t+2, etc.,
due to the effect on ht, which flows downstream over time.  The levels of all of the choice variables are
therefore sensitive to how heavily those future costs “count” in today’s decisions, which is reflected in
the discount rate r. Also in contrast to scenario3, even with r=0, the optimal level of hydrological
contamination is always nonzero.  This difference arises because when flow is a function of
contamination levels, the only way for each cell to take advantage of the natural cleansing value derived
from the flow is to maintain a positive contamination level.  Maintaining a zero level for the upstream
cell, for instance, would require abating everything entering the system, a1=x1 - fh1= x1 if h1=0.  At this
abatement level, the landowners would lose the abatement cost benefits of the natural flow.  Therefore17
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it is both privately and socially optimal to maintain some level of background contamination when the
flow mechanism takes this form.
5. POLICY SOLUTIONS
Taxes or subsidies that alter production costs are commonly suggested as a means of changing
the level at which production, along with its external side effects, is engaged in. Taxes or subsidies may
be placed on any of the variables in a production optimization problem. In the scenario described here,
they could change the farm’s production function as shown:
or
or
where tax1 is a tax on a cell’s agricultural effort, tax2 is a tax on a cell’s contamination level, and subs1
is a subsidy on the cost of abatement.  Is it possible to use taxes or subsidies such as these to correct
the externalities described in scenarios 1,2, and 3 above?
As explained above, scenario 1 does not represent a true externality, and therefore requires no
policy intervention to correct.  For the remaining scenarios, Table 4 shows the taxes or subsidies that
would need to be applied in order to induce the entire system to operate at socially optimal levels.  18
scenario 2 scenario 3
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subs1 None None
Table 4: Taxes and subsidies to correct three types of externalities
Note that when the flow is a function of effort, the only effective tax is a tax on effort, and when flow is
a function of contaminant level, the only effective tax is a tax on contaminant level.  Under scenario 3,
when flow is a function of effort, taxing upstream hydrology does not affect the upstream landowner’s
decision about effort level at all; effort and abatement levels remain constant regardless of contaminant
tax, only the pooled stock of contamination changes.  The downstream landowner therefore continues
to receive an excessive contaminant flow from the higher-than-optimal upstream effort level.  Under 
both scenarios, a subsidy on abatement provides a production incentive in the wrong direction; a non-
negative subsidy is in fact a lowering of production costs that encourages production effort to rise rather
than fall.  The only way to lower effort levels to the socially optimal level is to tax abatement; this
returns effort to socially optimal levels, but skews the other incentives, so that abatement is lower and
hydrological contamination is higher.19
Note that it is the upstream cell’s behavior that the policy is intended to alter; the downstream
cell’s private optimization process produces the social optimum if the upstream cell behaves optimally.
This result arises because there are no external effects considered for the downstream cell’s activities;
the presence of downstream costs for flow2 would change that result.  In the present model, an efficient
policy requires the asymmetric application of a tax or subsidy– i.e. the tax or subsidy would apply only
to the upstream cell.
From a local perspective, however, there are problems involved with the application of a tax to
the upstream cell.  In particular, if the amount collected for the tax leaves the system altogether (i.e. is
transferred to neither the upstream or the downstream cell), then the presence of the tax itself changes
the landscape’s social optimum.  If upstream agricultural effort results in a loss to the system through the
tax mechanism, for instance, then a local social planner would prefer to redistribute agricultural effort,
with a lower amount upstream and larger amount downstream.  The redistribution of effort and
contamination across the entire system would moderate the total loss generated by the tax mechanism.
This tension between scales of optimization may result in complex and counter-intuitive policy measures
at different levels of authority.
If, on the other hand, the tax revenue stays within the closed landscape system, then the policy
can be used to achieve a social optimum that remains undistorted.  Suppose, for instance, that the tax
proceeds were transferred to the downstream cell in a lump sum payment.  The tax and the payment
would cancel one another out in the social planner’s objective function, and the social optimum would
remain unchanged.  Such a system, however, still requires the governing authority to establish in20
advance the price that must be charged as a tax in order for the upstream cell to arrive at the socially
optimal activity level.
Suppose instead that the policy were set up as a permit system rather than a tax.  The structure
of an appropriate permit system would have to depend on the structure of the physical flow.  As in the
tax system described above, the permit system would be asymmetrically applied in that only the
upstream cell would be required to have permits for their production activity.  When flow is a function
of effort, then permits would apply to effort, and when flow is a function of contamination, then permits
would apply to contamination.  The upstream cell would be required to purchase from the downstream
cell the right to either engage in upstream effort or to accumulate contamination, depending on the
structure of the physical flow.  The downstream cell maintains the right to either sell or not sell the
permits, depending on the price that is agreed upon.
The advantage to this system, from a policy-maker’s perspective, is that the price of permits,
and the quantity transferred, are jointly determined by the parties themselves, and therefore do no need
to be established in advance.  The governing authority is responsible only for determining the
appropriate number of permits to issue.  Surprisingly, the downstream cell can be issued an unlimited
number of permits, and the number transferred will still settle to the socially optimal level  or  , x1
* h1
*
depending on which level requires permits.  Through the negotiation process, the price of the permits
will also arrive at equilibrium levels equivalent to the tax levels shown above.  Intuitively, this result
makes sense; the taxes are imposed to represent the interests of the lower cell in terms of the marginal4A barred variable represents the number of permits issued, while the subscript on barred
variables denotes the cell to which the permits are issued.
21
cost imposed by upstream activity.  When the lower cell represents its own interest through the
negotiating process, the same result will be arrived at.
As with other permit schemes, it turns out that the initial distribution of permits does not affect
the efficiency of the permitting policy if the proper number of permits (i.e.  ) are allocated and as h or x 1
* 
1
*
long as a market for those permits exists.  The upstream cell would simply purchase the remaining
permits from the downstream cell.  But this permit scheme, like others, is vulnerable to the critique that
if the policymaker knew  , and therefore knew the optimal number of permits to issue, then why not h1
*
simply impose a pollution flow standard on the upstream cell and be done with it?  How could a
permitting scheme be used to accommodate the fact that the permitting agency may not have enough
information on the production systems in each cell to determine  ? h  or x 1
*
1
*
As seen above, if a greater-than-necessary number of permits is issued to the downstream cell
(i.e.,  )4, there is no efficiency loss because the remaining permits would simply remain unsold; h  h 2 1
* >
the upstream cell is not willing to pay enough for each permit to induce the downstream cell to sell them.
Does the same result hold if a greater-than-necessary number of permits are allocated to the upstream
cell?  When the permits are issued upstream, then the downstream cell has the option of purchasing any
permits to prevent h1 contamination, however the marginal analysis breaks down if the number of22
permits exceeds  , the privately optimal upstream hydrology or effort levels.  Suppose  $ $ h  or x 1 1 h h 1 1 > $
permits are issued.  Even in the absence of a market, the upstream cell would not use more than$ h1
permits, but in order to alter the upstream cell’s production decisions, the downstream cell would have
to purchase all  excess permits.  If the additional cost incurred to begin abatement, which totals h h 1 1 - $
, is greater than the potential net benefits of permit trading that accrue to the price*(h h ) 1 1 - $
downstream cell, then the downstream cell will opt not to participate in the market and will instead
settle for the results of the upstream cell’s private optimization process.  Such a result would represent
an inefficient policy outcome.  This problem could be addressed by simply issuing the upstream cell
enough permits to cover its current contaminant level,  .  Permit trading from this point should result $ h1
in an efficient level of h1, with the downstream cell finding it worthwhile, in terms of avoided costs, to
purchase ( ) permits. $ h h 1 1
* -
What would happen if too few permits were offered ( )?  Regardless of initial h h 1 1
* <
distribution, the same outcome would be achieved– the upstream cell would purchase, or retain, all of
the permits available, and would operate at  . h1
6. CONCLUSIONS
Designing appropriate policies for pollution control in a spatial context requires an
understanding of the biophysical processes underlying the externality, both to determine the socially23
desired level of pollution flow and pollution control as well as to determine which types of policies will
be effective at generating them.  The size and shape of the wedge between social and private optimal
production levels generated by an agricultural externality will depend, for instance, on whether the
external effect is due to the magnitude of current upstream agricultural effort or the magnitude of the
contaminant accumulation that results from that effort.  The structure of the external flow will also
determine the extent to which current activity translates into future costs downstream.
When the external flow increases with increasing upstream hydrological contamination level, the
appropriate policy alternative is a tax applied to upstream hydrology.  Such a policy would induce the
upstream landowner to take into account the effect that the accumulating contamination is having
downstream.  The objective of the tax is not necessarily to drive the upstream contamination to zero.
There is a certain social value generated by the natural flow of the contaminant out of the system
without expenditure on abatement; although it is unfortunate that the contaminant must first flow through
the downstream cell, even a social planner would choose to take advantage of this free cleaning service,
which can only be done if contaminant levels are non-zero. 
When the contaminant flow between cells increases with upstream agricultural effort, then the
appropriate policy response to correct the externality is a tax applied to upstream effort levels.  In this
case, the upstream landowner can maximize the private benefit derived from the natural cleansing flow
of the landscape by increasing effort levels, but he has the appropriate incentives to keep contaminant
levels low.  This is accomplished by increasing both effort and abatement levels, at the expense of
downstream cells.  The imposed tax on effort corrects this incentive.24
It is possible to design permit schemes to correct for the market failure as well.  These schemes
are site-specific in that only parties whose activities generate externalities (in this case the upstream
cells) are required to have permits, and process-specific in that the permits, like the taxes, must be
applied to the appropriate flow process– either the effort level or the contaminant level.  At the
extreme, in a two-party model, issuing either  mimics a Coasian scenario, and h  or h h 1 2 2 = ¥ = $
negotiation (or trading) results in a socially efficient outcome.  When permits are split between the
parties, whether the outcome of the negotiation process is socially efficient depends on whether an
efficient number of permits ( ) are issued. h h h 1 2 1
* + =
An understanding of the nature of spatial flow relationships is therefore critical in the search for
ways to correct for market failure as well as in characterizing what the socially desirable objectives are.
This model presents highly simplified examples of such flow processes, and the diverging results
produced in terms of landscape hydrology, producer incentives, and policy measures.25
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